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Abstract. We study a network formation game where nodes wish to
send traffic to other nodes. Nodes can contract bilaterally other nodes to
form bidirectional links as well as nodes can break unilaterally contracts
to eliminate the corresponding links. Our model is an extension of the
model considered in [1,2]. The novelty is that we do no require the traffic
to be uniform all-to-all. Each node specifies the amount of traffic that
it wants to send to any other node. We characterize stable topologies
under a static point of view and we also study the game under a myopic
dynamics. We show its convergence to stable networks under some nat-
ural assumptions on the contracting functions. Finally we consider the
efficiency of pairwise Nash topologies from a social point of view and we
show that the problem of deciding the existence stable topologies of a
given price is NP-complete.
1 Introduction
Nowadays social and economic networks, and even communication networks are
typically endogenous and operate at scale that makes unpractical the use of
centralized policies. In all these networks, nodes can be seen as autonomous
agents that wish to communicate to each other. Each agent may choose whom
to accept connections from and whom to connect to. Moreover nodes can also
decide to break a set of non profitable connections. Network Formation Games
provide a natural model with which to study networks that are formed by ad
hoc and decentralized dynamics. A simple exemple of network formation game
is the model known as Local Connection Game defined in [3].
There are several studies related to network formation games. A seminal
work is the paper [4] in which graphs describe cooperative structures and rep-
resent coalitions among the players. Subsequently in [5] the authors consider
dynamics for network formation (see [6] for a survey on cooperative games).
In [7] the authors study a network design game known by Fair Connection
Game. A weighted extension of this model is considered in [8]. Models in which
nodes can create links unilaterally are known by unilateral connection games
see e.g. [9,10,11,12,13]. In the bilateral connection games links are created only
⋆ Partially supported MEC TIN-2007-66523 (FORMALISM).
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when both end nodes accept. Some examples of this type of games can be found
in [14,15,16] (See [17] for a survey).
In this paper we study an extension of the network formation model with
bilateral contracting defined in [1,2]. Instead of considering only an all-to-all
communication pattern, we extend the model to a non uniform traffic pattern.
We are interested in understanding the behavior of the networks when the agents
interact to choose their connections. In particular we study both the role of the
bilateral contracts and the role of the heterogeneous traffic, in the dynamic pro-
cess of shaping a network. Following standard game theory we refer the decision
makers as players. The main elements of the game are the following:
1. Nodes are players;
2. Links represent bilateral agreements between their end nodes;
3. Each node can deviate its strategy by breaking contracts with other nodes
(unilateral deviation) or by agreeing to the creation of a link with another node
(bilateral deviation);
4. Given a network topology the pay offs of nodes depend on the cost of partic-
ipating in the network as well as on the payments between the end nodes of a
link.
Our study focuses on the stability of the networks, not only from a static
point of view, but also from a dynamic point of view. Since in our model players
can deviate their strategies bilaterally we consider the natural notion of pairwise
Nash equilibrium also used in [1,18,2]. Our first contribution is a general charac-
terization of pairwise Nash stable topologies. We show that these stable graphs
are forests that depend on the traffic matrix. If the traffic matrix corresponds to
a uniform topology like all-to-all, then we obtain an equivalent characterization
to the one shown in [1].
In order to study how a network would evolve under the interactions between
players, we define a discrete myopic dynamics. We prove that the computation
of the Best Response is NP-hard and then, in order to avoid this computational
hardness, we define a set of actions that can be taken by a node in one round
in such a way that the computation of the best one can be done efficiently. We
also show the convergence the dynamics to pairwise Nash stable configurations
for any given traffic matrix under some natural assumptions on the contracting
functions. Furthermore if the traffic matrix correspond to trees or to complete
graphs, then dynamics converges after a polynomial number of rounds in expec-
tation.
Our third contribution is related with the efficiency of the pairwise Nash
topologies from both social point of view and computational point of view. For
some particular traffic patterns we are able to characterize their optimal topolo-
gies an then we can discuss about the efficiency of their equilibria (how an equi-
librium could be close to the optimum). But from a computational point of view
we show that problem of deciding the existence of a pairwise Nash equilibrium
of a given social cost is NP-complete.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the
game model. In section 3 we show a characterization of pairwise Nash topologies.
Heterogeneous Traffic, Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics 3
In section 4 we define a natural myopic dynamics and we prove its convergence to
pairwise Nash topologies for any given traffic pattern. In section 5 we study the
efficiency of equilibria from the social point of view as well as the computational
complexity of deciding the existence of efficient equilibria. The proofs of many
results are in online appendices.
2 The Formation Game
We consider a Network Formation Game where the players are nodes of a network
that wish to connect with other nodes. This game is an extension of the model
defined in [1,2] to heterogeneous traffic matrix. Our game models a scenario
where for each pair i, j of nodes, i wants to send some amount of traffic tij ≥ 0 to
j instead of considering the uniform all-to-all traffic pattern studied in [1]. Nodes
contract with other nodes bilaterally to form bidirectional communication links.
Each contract is the result of a bilateral agreement, one node seeks the agreement
and the other node accepts it, and then there is a transfer of utility from the
seeking node to the accepting one. Moreover each node has a cost which depends
on the resulting topology. The payment that each node has to make takes into
account the link maintenance, the routing costs and a disconnection cost. Given
a network topology, nodes’ payoffs are obtained from payments between nodes
participating in the same link minus their cost.
We use the notation G = (V,E) to represent a graph (undirected or directed).
We denote by ij the edge or undirected link between the nodes i and j and we
denote by (i, j) the arc or directed link from node i to node j. By an abuse of
notation we use the shorthand ij ∈ G (or (i, j) ∈ G) instead of using the name
E of the set of edges ij ∈ E (or arcs (i, j) ∈ E). Following the same style, we
use G + ij (or G + (i, j)) to represent the new graph resulting from adding ij
(or (i, j) to the set E) and we use G − ij (or G − (i, j)) to represent the new
graph resulting from removing ij (or (i, j) to the set E). We denote by Cu the
connected component of G that contains the node u. We refer to the number of
nodes by n.
Formally, the resulting network topology of our network formation game is an
undirected graph G = (V,E) where each node of V represents a player and each
edge ij represents an undirected link between i and j. Let tij ≥ 0 the number of
packets that i wants to send to j. We represent this traffic pattern by a traffic
matrix T = (tij)i,j∈V . Given a traffic matrix T we define its associate undirected
graph as GT = (V, {ij : tij + tji > 0}). We assume that given network topology,
traffic is routed along shortest paths. In case of multiples shortest paths of equal
length, traffic is split equally among all available paths.
Each node i ∈ V has a cost
C(i;G) = π δ(i;G) + ci f(i;G) +D(i;G)
where π is the cost per link and δ(i;G) denotes the degree of i in G, ci is the
routing cost per unit of traffic and f(i;G) is the total traffic that transits though
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i and D(i;G) is the disconnection cost. Note that the first term corresponds to
the link maintenance cost and the second corresponds to the routing cost.
Let Participants(i) = {j : tij + tji > 0}. We assume that the disconnection
cost D has to satisfy the following two natural assumptions:
Assumption 1 (About disconnection): D(i;G) = 0 if i is connected to all its
participants. Otherwise, if j ∈ Participants(i), and and Ci 6= Cj , then D(i;G+
ik) = D(i;G + il) when k, l ∈ Cj . The disconnection cost only depends on
whether i is connected to j and not on the selected link il.
Assumption 2 (About connection): Given a player i and two configurations
(G,Γ,P) and (G′, Γ,P) such that Participants(i) ∩ Ci ⊂ Participants(i) ∩ C′i
then U(i;G,P) < U(i;G′,P′).
Let pij denote a payment from i to j. We assume that if a link ij does not
exists or if i = j, then pij = 0. We refer to P = (pij)i,j∈V as the payment
matrix. This payment matrix will be specified later (it depends on a contracting
function which at the same time depends on the resulting topology).
Then, the total utility of a node i in graph G with payment matrix P is
defined by
U(i;G,P) =
∑
j 6=i
(pji − pij)− C(i;G)
In order to formalize the agreements between the players we consider for
each node i two sets: Fi ⊆ V \ {i} is the set of nodes that i is willing to accept
connections from and Ti ⊆ V \ {i} is the set of nodes it wants to connect to. Let
T = (Ti)i∈V and F = (Fi)i∈V be the strategy vectors.
Given strategy vectors T and F, let Γ = Γ (T,F) a directed graph repre-
senting the contracting graph which captures the direction of the link formation
and let G = G(T,F) the resulting topology. A contract (i, j) ∈ Γ if and only if
i ∈ Fj and j ∈ Ti. An undirected link ij ∈ G if and only if (i, j) ∈ Γ or (j, i) ∈ Γ
We assume that there is contracting function Q(i, j;G) that specifies the
transfer of benefit from i to j in when the topology is G. (If Q(i, j;G) < 0, then
the transfer if from j to i). Given strategy vectors T and F, the payment matrix
P = (pij)i,j∈V is defined as
pij =
{
Q(i, j;G) if (i, j) ∈ Γ
0 otherwise
We say that (G,Γ,P) is a feasible configuration if there exists (T,F) such
that G = G(T,F), Γ = Γ (T,F) and P = P(T,F). In this case we say that
(T,F) generates configuration (G,Γ,P). Hence, given strategy vectors (T,F),
the utility of node i is U(i;G(T,F),P(T,F)). By an abuse of notation we will
often use the shorthand G, Γ and P to refer to specific instantiations of network
topology G(T,F), contracting graph Γ (T,F), and payment matrix P(T,F),
respectively.
The contracting functions can be interpreted as the outcome of a negotiation
process which depends on the network topology. Instead of focusing on particu-
lar contracting functions we are interested in contracting functions having two
natural properties: anti-symmetry and affinity.
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Property 1 (Anti-symmetry): Q is anti-symmetric if Q(i, j;G) = −Q(j, i;G).
(The payment for a link does not depend on which node asks for the connection).
Property 2 (Affinity): Q is affine if for each i, j, k such that j ∈ Participant(i)
and k 6∈ Participant(i) then |Q(i, j;G+ ij)| > |Q(i, k;G+ ik)|.
3 Pairwise Nash Stability
Our study focuses on stability notion, so we need to use an appropriate equi-
librium concept. In our model players may deviate their strategies unilaterally
or bilaterally. In particular, a node i may choose to not create a link ij, not
including j in Ti or Fi. Even a node i may break a link ij by removing j from
Ti or Fi. But node i can not create a new link ij unilaterally, it depends on
that j accepts the contract from i. Formally, the link ij is created if and only
if i ∈ Tj and j ∈ Fi, or j ∈ Ti and i ∈ Fj . If only node i is asked to include
j in Ti and it is the case that Fj does not contain i, then i the link ij can not
be created. Hence, in an stable situation no node i has incentive to break uni-
laterally any contract and no pair of nodes have incentive of creating bilaterally
a link. This notion corresponds to the pairwise Nash stability also used in [1].
A pairwise Nash equilibrium can be defined as the conjunction of the classical
Nash equilibrium and pairwise stability first introduced by [14].
In order to define formally the concept of pairwise Nash equilibrium, we
first need to know how a deviation of the strategy vectors modifies the outcome
configuration.
Given a strategy vector (T,F), let (T′,F′) be the resulting strategy vector
after applying a deviation on (T,F). Then the resulting configuration is defined
as follows: G′ = G(T′,F′), Γ ′ = Γ (T′,F′) and P′ = (p′ij)i,j∈V where
p′kl =


pkl if (k, l) ∈ Γ ′ and (k, l) ∈ Γ
Q(k, l;G′) if (k, l) ∈ Γ ′ and (k, l) /∈ Γ
0 otherwise
Let us remind the classical concepts of Nash equilibrium and pairwise stabil-
ity. A strategy vector (T,F) is a Nash equilibrium if for every node i, any unilat-
eral deviation T ′i and F
′
i does not increment its utility, U(i;G,P) ≥ U(i;G
′,P′).
A configuration (G,Γ,P) is pairwise stable if and only if for every uv ∈ G,
U(u;G,P) ≥ U(u;G − uv,P′) (no node has incentive to delete a link), and
for every uv 6∈ G, if U(u;G + uv,P′) > U(u;G,P) then U(v;G + uv,P′) <
U(v;G + uv,P′) (no pair of nodes have both incentive to add a new link be-
tween them).
Now we have all the ingredients to define the appropriate notion of stability.
Definition 1. A strategy vector (T,F) is a pairwise Nash equilibrium if (T,F)
is a Nash equilibrium and its outcome (G,Γ,P) is pairwise stable. A configura-
tion (G,Γ,P) is pairwise Nash stable if there exists a pairwise Nash equilibrium
(T,F) such that G = G(T,F), Γ = Γ (T,F) and P = P (T,F).
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In [1] and [2], the pairwise Nash equilibrium concept was defined in a different
way, but it is not hard to see that both definitions are equivalent.
In other words, in our game, pairwise Nash equilibrium means that no node
i has incentive to delete a set of contracts, and no pair of nodes i, j agree in
creating a new link ij ( i.e. if the utility of i is incremented then the utility of j
is decremented).
We are interested in characterizing the topologies that, independently of the
other parameters, lead to a pairwise Nash equilibrium configuration. We say that
a configuration (G,Γ,P) is undirected if (u, v) ∈ Γ then (v, u) /∈ Γ . Notice that
in a no undirected configuration a contract may be broken without changing the
topology.
Definition 2. A graph G is a pairwise Nash equilibrium topology if and only if
every feasible and undirected configuration (G,Γ,P) is a pairwise Nash equilib-
rium.
It is not hard to see that there exists pairwise Nash equilibrium configurations
(G,Γ,P) where G is not a topology pairwise Nash equilibrium. Note that by
definition, the stability of a topology is independent of the contracting function.
In the following theorem we characterize pairwise Nash stable topologies.
Theorem 1. Given a traffic matrix T , a graph G is a pairwise Nash equilibrium
topology if and only if G satisfies the following properties:
1. For every pair u, v ∈ G such that u ∈ Participants(v) then Cu = Cv.
2. G is a forest.
3. For every edge uv ∈ G then, let be G′ = G − uv, C′u ∩ Participants(v) 6= ∅
and C′v ∩ Participants(u) 6= ∅.
Proof. Let G be a pairwise Nash equilibrium topology:
(i) Let us suppose that there exists a pair u, v such that v ∈ Participants(u)
and Cu 6= Cv. Then u and v can deviate bilaterally by adding the link uv to
increment their utilities.
(ii) If there exists a link uv ∈ G contained in a cycle then for some contracting
function we have that puv − pvu > 0. Note that if u eliminates uv (breaking the
contract (u, v) or (v, u)) then u still remains connected to its participants, the
maintenance cost decreases by π, and the total traffic through u in G − uv is
not greater than that the one through u in G. Therefore node u can increment
its utility applying such unilateral deviation.
(iii) Let us suppose that there are a node u and link uv such that u remains
connected to its participants in G − uv. Hence for a contracting function such
that puv − pvu > 0, u can increase its utility by eliminating the link uv.
Let (G,Γ,P) be a feasible undirected configuration where G satisfies 1,2
and 3. No node u wants to break unilaterally a set of contracts C 6= ∅. If u
breaks a contract then by property (iii) u becomes disconnected from some of
its participants and then this unilateral deviation is not profitable.
Neither a pair u, v wants to deviate bilaterally. Notice that if a link uv is
added, then for a contracting function such that puv − pvu > 0, the utility of
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u is decreased strictly (the maintenance and routing costs of u at least remain
equal). ⊓⊔
Given the above characterization it is not hard to see that if a topology
G is a spanning forest of GT then G is a pairwise Nash equilibrium topology:
G is acyclic, all nodes are connected to its participants and for each link uv,
u ∈ Participants(v), stronger statement than condition 3.
Corollary 1. Let T be a traffic matrix. Then every spanning forest of GT is a
pairwise Nash equilibrium topology.
Notice that there exists pairwise Nash equilibrium topologies that are not span-
ning trees of GT , figure 1 is an example. If we consider a uniform traffic then we
obtain the following result which corresponds to the characterization presented
in [1] for the all-to-all case.
Corollary 2. Let T be a traffic matrix so that GT is a complete graph. Assuming
that π > 0, for any contracting function Q, a feasible undirected configuration
(G,Γ,P) is a pairwise Nash equilibrium iff G is a tree.
a
b
c
d
GT
a
b
c
d
G
Fig. 1: G pairwise Nash equilibrium no spanning tree of GT
4 Myopic Dynamics
One of our main purposes is to define a myopic dynamics for our network for-
mation game that converges to pairwise Nash equilibrium configurations. We
are interested in discrete myopic dynamics where at each round players change
their strategies to maximize their current utility. Our dynamics should allow to
study the game as a process where players interact over time through deviations.
Furthermore, the fact of being myopic allows us to represent realistic situations
where players update their strategic decisions having only a limited knowledge
of the world. Instead of considering a long-term objective, at each round players
take actions that can be seen as an efficient algorithm to optimize their current
payoff immediately. This requirement precludes the use of the best response dy-
namics since in our network formation game to find the deviation that maximize
the utility of a node is computationally hard.
Formally, we define best response problem in the classic way as follows,
BEST RESPONSE: Given a tuple 〈Q, T, π, (ci)i∈G〉 that defines a game setting,
a configuration (G,Γ,P), a node u, and a value C decide whether there is a
deviation for u such that after applying it, u’s utility is greater or equal than C.
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Theorem 2. The BEST RESPONSE problem is NP-complete.
This NP-completeness result lead us to reconsider the definition of each round
of the dynamics. The main idea behind our dynamics definition is to restrict the
best response so that the players’ decisions can be computed in polynomial time
and so that the dynamics converges to a pairwise Nash equilibrium.
Our dynamics is based in rounds. For every round k, let (G(k), Γ (k),P(k))
the configuration at the beginning of the round and uk the activated node by an
activation process. An activation process is any discrete time stochastic process
{Uk}k∈N where Uk are i.i.d. random variables from V drawn with full support.
A realization of an activation process is called an activation sequence
For the sake of simplicity we assume that π > 0 and we assume that any
initial configuration (G(0), Γ (0),P(0)) is a feasible undirected configuration.
At each round k the activated node uk can take one of the following actions:
1) to break a contract (uk, v) or (uk, v), therefore Γ
(k+1) = Γ (k) − (uk, v) or
Γ (k+1) = Γ (k) − (v, uk), respectively, G(k+1) = G(k) − ukv and P(k+1) = P(k
′),
2) to update the payment of a contract (uk, v) or (v, uk), and then p
(k+1)
ukv =
Q(uk, v;G
(k) + ukv), Γ
(k+1) = Γ (k) and G(k+1) = Gk,
3) to ask for a new contract (uk, v), and if it was accepted by both uk and v,
then Γ (k+1) = Γ (k) + (uk, v), G
(k+1) = Gk + ukv and P
(k+1) = P(k)
′
,
4) to do nothing, (G(k+1), Γ (k+1),P(k+1)) = (G(k), Γ (k),P(k)).
¿From all these possible actions, uk selects the one that maximizes its util-
ity. If uk has multiple optimal choices, we assume that one of them is selected
randomly.
Notice that by the definition of the myopic dynamics we have that any acces-
sible configuration (G(k), Γ (k),P(k)) is an undirected configuration and satisfies
that if (u, v) 6∈ Γ (k) then p
(k)
uv = 0.
Definition 3 (Convergence). Given any initial configuration (G(0), Γ (0),P(0))
and an instance of the activation process, we say that the dynamics converges if
there exists K such that (G(k+1), Γ (k+1),P(k+1)) = (G(k), Γ (k),P(k)) for k > K.
We say that, the dynamics converges uniformly if for every ǫ > 0 there exists
K such that Pr
[
(G(k+1), Γ (k+1),P(k+1)) = (G(k), Γ (k),P(k)), ∀k > K
]
≥ 1 − ǫ
where the probability is taken w.r.t. the activation process.
We say that a configuration is a sink configuration if whatever node is ac-
tivated, it will choose to do nothing. Since we are assuming that π > 0, then
a sink configuration has to be an acyclic topology. Moreover, it is not hard to
see that in any sink configuration no node can break a set of contracts (not
only one contract) improving in this way its benefit. Neither,a pair of nodes can
increment their benefit by adding a new link between them. Then we have the
following stability property of the sink configurations.
Proposition 1. If (G(k), Γ (k),P(k)) is a sink configuration then (G(k), Γ (k),P(k))
is a pairwise Nash equilibrium.
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The following theorem establishes the convergence of our dynamics when the
contracting function is antisymmetric and affine. From now on let us suppose
that Q is an antisymmetric and affine contracting function.
Theorem 3. Let (G(0), Γ (0),P(0)) be any initial configuration. For any activa-
tion process the dynamics converges uniformly. Further, if the activation process
is uniform then the expected number of rounds is O(en).
The main idea of the proof is based on defining a degree of configuration
an then show that this degree decreases as the dynamics evolves. The so called
degree is defined by a tuple of four no negative integer values. These values give
us information about the relation between the current topology G(k) and the
given traffic matrix T . In fact we prove that at each round, some of these values
never increase and if the current configuration is not a pairwise Nash equilibrium,
then these values decrease strictly with a probability greater than zero. Finally,
since the configurations with minimum degree are stable, then we can conclude
that our dynamics converges. Let us introduce formally the key element of the
proof and all the properties needed to prove the dynamics convergence.
Definition 4 (Degree of a configuration). We associate to each configu-
ration (G,Γ,P) a degree denoted by δ(G,Γ,P) and defined by δ(G,Γ,P) =
(CF , CE , AE , AP ) where:
CF is the number of edges that have to be removed to have a spanning forest of
G.
CE is the maximum number of edges, such that their contracts are agreed between
two nodes no participants, in all spanning forests of G. CE = maxB∈ST (G) |{uv :
uv ∈ E(B) ∧ u /∈ Participants(v)}|, where ST (G) is the set of all spanning
forests of G.
AE is the minimum number of edges to be added in order to get a graph in which
each node is connected to its participants.
AP is the number of no updated contracts, this is |{(i, j) : (i, j) ∈ Γ, pij 6=
Q(i, j;G)}|.
Since any sink configuration (G,Γ,P) is a pairwise Nash equilibrium, we have
that is (G,Γ,P) a feasible configuration, G can not contain any cycle, and each
node is connected to all its participants.
Lemma 1. If (G,Γ,P) is sink configuration then we have δ(G,Γ,P) = (0, CE , 0, 0).
Furthermore, if δ(G,Γ,P) = (0, 0, 0, 0) then (G,Γ,P) is a sink configuration.
In order to simplify the notation, let δ(G(k), Γ (k),P(k)) = (C
(k)
F , C
(k)
E , A
(k)
E , A
(k)
P ).
Lemma 2. C
(k+1)
E +A
(k+1)
E ≤ C
(k)
E +A
(k)
E and C
(k+1)
F ≤ C
(k)
F .
Proof. Let us consider all the possible actions:
(a) If uk breaks a contract, then C
(k+1)
F ≤ C
(k)
F and C
(k+1)
E ≤ C
(k)
E . By breaking
a contract it can occur that A
(k+1)
E = A
(k)
E + 1, but in this case we have that
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C
(k+1)
E = C
(k)
E − 1 and then C
(k+1)
E +A
(k+1)
E ≤ C
(k)
E +A
(k)
E .
(b) If uk updates one contract, then the topology remains the same.
(c) If uk asks whether v accepts a contract (uk, v) w.l.o.g and v accepts it. Then
it can be the case that Cuk 6= Cv. If the new link ukv connects uk or v to one of
their (disconnected) participants then A
(k+1)
E = A
(k)
E − 1. If it is not the case, uk
only has incentive to add ukv if at least −pukv − π ≥ 0, and v has incentive to
accept the contract only if at least pukv − π ≥ 0. Since π > 0, it can not occur.
Finally, we can also consider the case that Cuk = Cv, i.e. ukv adds a new cycle.
But now we have the same conditions than in the previous case and then the
bilateral deviation does not occur.
Summarizing, ukv does not add a new cycle, C
(k+1)
F = C
(k)
F , ukv connects
at least two participants, A
(k+1)
E = A
(k)
E − 1, an since only a new link is added,
C
(k+1)
E ≤ C
(k)
E + 1. ⊓⊔
We can also guarantee that C
(k)
E +A
(k)
E is decremented when A
(k)
E = 1.
Lemma 3. If δ(G(k), Γ (k),P(k)) = (CF , CE , 1, AP ) then there exists a node u
such that its most profitable action is to create a new edge with one of its par-
ticipants so that the new configuration is (CF , CE , 0, A
′
P ) where A
′
P ≥ 0.
Proof. Since AE = 1, there exist u, v such that u ∈ Participants(v) and Cu 6=
Cv. Let us suppose thatQ(u, v;G+uv) ≤ 0. There always exists such u because of
the antisymmetric property of Q. If u is the active node, by the affinity property
of Q the most convenient for u is to create a contract with v than any other
w 6∈ Participants(u). ⊓⊔
We are now able to prove the convergence of our dynamics. In order to analyze
the expected number of rounds to converge in the worst case, we assume that
the activation process is uniform, i.e. for all nodes u, Pr [Uk = u] =
1
n
, where
n is the number of nodes. The convergence proof continues to hold even the
activation process is not uniform.
Proof (of theorem 2).
Let δ(G(k), Γ (k),P(k)) = (CF , CE , AE , AP ) and let δ(G
(k+1), Γ (k+1),P(k+1)) =
(C′F , C
′
E , A
′
E , A
′
P ). At each round k, depending of the current value AE we have
one of the following cases:
AE > 1 : With probability p ≥
AE
n
one new link will be added and with proba-
bility p ≤ 1− AE
n
a contract can be broken.
AE = 1 : With probability p ≥
1
n
, by lemma 3 the activated node adds a link
with a participant. With p ≤ n−1
n
it can be added a link between no participants
or if CF + CE > 0 even a contract can be broken.
AE = 0 : By lemma 2 no link will be added. If a contract is eliminated then
it can be the case that the corresponding link does not belong to a cycle (cut
link) and either it connects two participants (C′E = CE − 1, A
′
E = 1), or not
(C′E = CE − 1, A
′
E = 0 and then C
′
E + A
′
E < CE + AE). Or it can be the case
that the corresponding link is in a cycle (C′F = CF − 1, A
′
E = 0).
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Now we are going to analyze the expected number of rounds to reach a sink
configuration. First of all note that CE +AE ≤ n and CF ≤ n− 1.
Given a round k let’s show that in expectation, after O(n
n
n! ) rounds either
the dynamics reaches to a sink configuration or it arrives at least one time to an
AE = 1 configuration:
- if AE > 1 then with probability p ≥
AE !
nAE
, after AE − 1 rounds it shall end up
to a configuration with AE = 1. Hence in an expected number of rounds O(
nn
n! )
we arrive at least one time at a AE = 1 configuration.
- if AE = 0 after O(n
2 lnn) rounds either the topology has changed or we have
a sink. In O(n2 lnn) rounds, in expectation, all nodes are activated n times,
thus if topology remains equal we arrive to a feasible configuration, because
all contracts are updated. With an additional O(n lnn) rounds all nodes are
activated once more, and if topology has not changed then the configuration is
a sink, because all nodes have chosen to do nothing. If the topology change it
is because a contract has been broken. In this case if the corresponding link is
a cutting edge that routes traffic then A′E = 1 configuration. Otherwise A
′
E = 0
configuration and C′F + C
′
E < CF + CE . Hence after O(n
4 lnn) rounds either
the dynamics reaches to A′E = 1 or to a sink (it is not possible change more than
n2 times the topology without reaching to an AE = 1 configuration).
If we arrive O(n) times at a AE = 1 configuration then, in expectation, a
node adds a link with a participant. So given a round k, in expectation, after
O(n2 n
n
n! ) rounds the dynamics achieve a CE + AE = 0 configuration or a sink
configuration.
Once the current configuration has CE + AE = 0, by lemma 2 never we
will arrive to an AE > 0 configuration, so after O(n
4 lnn) rounds the dynamics
converges to an (0, 0, 0, 0) configuration.
⊓⊔
We notice that the assumptions made on the contracting function are not
very strong and it seems that since we do not have many restrictions the path
leading to a stable configuration can be very long, as we have seen just above.
In the following we focus on the study of the dynamics behavior on particular
cases. We show that the dynamics is so efficient in the case of all-to-all traffic
pattern as well as in the case of tree traffic patterns.
Theorem 4. Let T an all-to-all traffic matrix. For a uniform activation process,
the dynamics converges uniformly in O(n4 lnn) rounds.
Theorem 5. Let T traffic matrix such that GT is a tree . For a uniform acti-
vation process, the dynamics converges uniformly in O(n4 lnn) rounds.
5 Efficiency and Complexity
We are interested in quantifying how bad are the effects of the competitive and
selfish behavior of the players not only from the computational point of view, but
also from the qualitative point of view. Since we consider any traffic pattern, in
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general we can show that there exist stable configurations that are no sufficiently
good from the social perspective. If we fix the traffic pattern, then we obtain
some better results.
The social cost SC of a graph G is defined by SC(G) =
∑
u∈GC(u;G).
Therefore the social cost depends only of the topology. Notice that contracts
induce zero-sum transfers among nodes and do not affect global efficiency. Then
considering the cost social as the sum of the costs or as the sum of the utilities
is the same (excepting for the sign). Therefore the social cost depends only of
the topology.
The optimal topology Gopt is the most efficient topology from the social
prospective. Formally, Gopt = argminG SC(G). The price of a topology G mea-
sures how far G is from the optimum and is defined by P (G) = SC(G)
SC(Gopt)
. Finally,
the price of stability (PoS) and the price of anarchy (PoA) are defined as the
minimum and maximum price of a pairwise Nash equilibrium topology, respec-
tively.
For some particular traffic patterns we are able to characterize their optimal
topologies an then we can discuss about the efficiency of their equilibria. If the
pattern is a tree, that is GT is a tree then there is only one pairwise Nash
equilibrium topology, that corresponds to GT . Furthermore GT = Gopt since it
is connected, and any connected graph has a routing cost greater than GT and
a maintenance cost greater or equal than GT .
Proposition 2. If GT is a tree, then PoS = PoA = 1.
If GT is a complete graph then the price of the anarchy changes substantially.
For example, if we consider a all-to-all traffic patern, this is GT is complete and
all traffic has the same weight, then a simple path maximizes the distances be-
tween all nodes, thus maximizes the social cost. An example of efficient topology
for the same traffic pattern is the star centered at a node with minimal routing
cost.
In general, if GT is the complete graph, then the price of the star is less than
2. The maintenance cost is 2(n − 1)π, less or equal than the maintenance cost
of the optimal. And for each packet sent by u and received by v, in the optimal
topology arises a cost greater or equal than (cu + cv)tuv, while in the star arises
exactly (cu+ cv+2cmin)tuv. The star centered in the minimal routing cost node
is a spanning tree of GT , so it is pairwise Nash equilibrium topology. It also can
be prove that always exists a path with PoA of the order O(n) (if we have a
weighted traffic pattern, the order of simple path affects the social cost).
Notice that the optimal depends of π since from social point of view it may
be preferable to have cycles when π is small enough w.r.t. the amount of traffic
through the nodes and the routing costs. For example, with GT complete and
π < cmintmin the complete graph is the optimal (tmin = mini,j∈V {tij}), from a
global point of view there is always incentive to add a link between two nodes.
Proposition 3. If GT is a complete graph, then PoS ≤ 2 and PoA = O(n).
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From the computational point of view we show that it is really to decide
whether, given the parameters that define the network formation game, there
exists a pairwise Nash topology with a social cost less than or equal to a given
cost. Even the problem of deciding whether given a game setting, there is a
topology with social cost less than or equal to a given cost. Formally these
problems are defined as follows,
LOWER SC EQUILIBRIUM: Given a tuple 〈T, π, (ci)i∈G, C〉, that defines
the game setting decide whether there is a pairwise Nash equilibrium topology
G such that SC(G) ≤ C.
LOWER SC: Given a tuple 〈T, π, (ci)i∈G, C〉, that defines a game setting decide
whether there is a topology G such that SC(G) ≤ C.
Theorem 6. LOWER SC and LOWER SC EQUILIBRIUM are NP-complete
problems.
References
1. Arcaute, E., Johari, R., Mannor, S.: Network formation: Bilateral contracting and
myopic dynamics. In: WINE. (2007)
2. Arcaute, E., Johari, R., Mannor, S.: Network formation: Bilateral contracting and
myopic dynamics. In: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. Volume 54. IEEE
Control Systems Society (Aug 2009)
3. Fabrikant, A., Luthra, A., Maneva, E., Papadimitriou, C.H., Shenker, S.: On a
network creation game. In: in Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Symposium on
Principles of Distributed Computing. (2003) 347–351
4. Myerson, R.B.: Graphs and cooperation in games. Discussion Papers 246, North-
western University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Manage-
ment Science (September 1976)
5. Aumann, R.J., Myerson, R.B.: Endogenous formation of links between players
and of coalitions: An application of the shapley value. Technical report, Stanford
University, Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences (1988)
6. den Nouweland, A.V.: Models of network formation in cooperative games. In
Demange, G., Wooders, M., eds.: Group Formation in Economics; Networks, Clubs,
and Coalitions, Cambridge University Press (2005) 58–88
7. Anshelevich, E., Dasgupta, A., Kleinberg, J., E´va Tardos, Wexler, T., Roughgar-
den, T.: The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation. In: In
FOCS. (2004) 295–304
8. lin Chen, H., Roughgarden, T.: Network design with weighted players. In: In
Proceedings of the 18th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Ar-
chitextures (SPAA). (2006) 29–38
9. Bala, V., Goyal, S.: A noncooperative model of network formation. Econometrica
68(5) (Sep 2000) 1181–1230
10. Sarangi, S., Kannan, R., Ray, L.: The structure of information networks. Royal
Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 182, Royal Economic Society (June
2003)
11. Haller, H., Sarangi, S.: Nash networks with heterogeneous agents. Discussion
Papers of DIW Berlin 337, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research
(2003)
14 Carme A`lvarez and Aleix Ferna`ndez
12. Feri, F.: Stochastic stability in network with decay. Working Papers 2005.40,
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (March 2005)
13. Haller, H., Kamphorst, J., Sarangi, S.: (non-)existence and scope of nash networks.
Economic Theory 31(3) (June 2007) 597–604
14. Jackson, M.O., Wolinsky, A.: A strategic model of social and economic networks.
Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Stud-
ies in Economics and Management Science (May 1995)
15. Gilles, R.P., Johnson, C.: original papers : Spatial social networks. Review of
Economic Design 5(3) (2000) 273–299
16. Furusawa, T., Konishi, H.: Free trade networks. Working Papers 2003.55, Fon-
dazione Eni Enrico Mattei (June 2003)
17. Jackson, M.O.: A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency.
Working Papers 1161, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humani-
ties and Social Sciences (March 2003)
18. Arcaute, E., Johari, R., Mannor, S.: Local two-stage myopic dynamics for network
formation games. In: WINE. (2008)
Heterogeneous Traffic, Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics 15
A Pairwise Nash Stability
Proof (corollary 1). Let G be a spanning forest of GT , then (1) for every pair
u, v ∈ G such that u ∈ Participants(v) then Cu = Cv, (2) G is a forest and (3)
for every link uv ∈ G, since u ∈ Participant(v) then if G′ = G − uv, we have
that C′u ∩ Participants(v) 6= ∅ and C
′
v ∩ Participants(u) 6= ∅. ⊓⊔
Proof (corollary 2). If G is a tree then G is pairwise Nash equilibrium, by corol-
lary 1.
If (G,Γ,P) is a pairwise Nash equilibrium configuration, G has no cycles
because π > 0 and all nodes are connected to its participants, therefore G is a
tree. ⊓⊔
B Myopic Dynamics
Proof (proposition 1). Let (G(k), Γ (k),P(k)) be a sink, then:
1. No node wants to update a contract. Thus for all (u, v) ∈ Γ (k), puv =
Q(u, v;G(k)), so (G(k), Γ (k),P(k)) is a feasible configuration.
2. No node wants to break a contract. Then G(k) is an acyclic graph, otherwise
it can be show that a node u will have incentive to break a contract. Let
uv be a link that is contained in some cycle. Without loss of generality, we
assume that puv − pvu ≥ 0, then u has incentive to break the link: in G−uv
u remains connected to its participants, the total of routing traffic through
u at G−uv is less or equal that at G and finally increases its payoff, because
puv − pvu + π > 0.
Now, let us suppose that there is a node u that has incentive to break a
minimal set A of links, where |A| > 2. Let v be a node such that uv ∈ A,
and let G′ = G − uv, clearly C′v ∩ Participants(u) = ∅. Since u has no
incentive to break uv, then cu f(uv;G) + π < pvu − puv. If we consider the
deviation of node u corresponding to break a set of links A′ = A − {uv}, if
G′′ = G−A′, then cu f(uv;G′′)+π ≤ cu f(uv;G)+π < pvu−puv. Therefore
if A is a profitable deviation, then A′ is profitable too. Note that once the A′
links have been broken, to break uv does not increase the u utility’s. Since
|A| > |A′|, then we have a contradiction with the fact that A is minimal.
So in a sink configuration all unilateral deviations leads to a utility loss.
3. No pair of nodes can improve their playoff adding a new link. Then, in
(G(k), Γ (k),P(k)) no bilateral deviation is profitable.
⊓⊔
Proof ( lemma 1). If (G,Γ,P) is a sink then is a pairwise Nash equilibrium: G
is acyclic, thus CF = 0, (G,Γ,P) is a feasible configuration, thus AP = 0, and
all nodes are connected to their participants, thus AE = 0.
If the degree of a configuration (G,Γ,P) is (0, 0, 0, 0), then the configuration
is feasible, G is a spanning tree of GT (G is acyclic and for all uv ∈ G, u ∈
Participants(v)), and finally any action of a node u other than do nothing
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decrements strictly its utility. Notice that there is no incentive to update a
contract because the configuration is feasible. Since for all (u, v) ∈ Γ we have
that (v, u) /∈ Γ then every link is a cutting edge between two participants.
Finally, if the utility of u does not decrease when a link uv is added, then
puv < 0. Hence v has no incentive to accept the proposal. ⊓⊔
Proof (theorem 4). Given any all-to-all traffic matrix, we have that CE = 0 in
any feasible configuration. Then no cutting edge will ever be deleted. While the
current topology is not connected, the optimal action of any node is to add a
link.
Once G is connected, the expected number of rounds needed to delete a link
is O(n2 lnn). Thus in O(n4 lnn) rounds the topology is a tree.
Once G is a tree only remains to update all contracts for arrive to a skin,
that needs an additional O(n2 lnn) rounds. ⊓⊔
Proof (theorem 5). Let GT be a tree. We are going to show that if AE ≥ 1 ,
then with probability greater than 1
n
the active node uk will add a (uk, v) where
v ∈ Participant(uk).
Notice that if AE ≥ 1 then there exists a set of nodes U = {u1, u2, . . . , ul}
such that each ui is not connected to all its participants. For each ui let Pi the
set of connected components Pi = {Cui1 , Cui2 , . . .} such that if P ∈ Pi then
P ∩ Participants(ui) 6= ∅.
For each node ui let us denote by vi the node chosen by ui to create a link
as its best optimal actionui and let pi ∈ Participants(ui) ∩ Cvi .
We define a directed graph G′ = (U, {(ui, pi) : ui ∈ U). G′ has at least a cycle
because every node in G′ is the source of an edge. Furthermore, every cycle of
G′ has length 2. Notice that if there is a cycle with length greater than two
w1, w2, w3, . . . , w1 then Tw1w2 +Tw2w1 , Tw2w3 +Tw3w2 , . . . , Twl′w1 +Tw1wl′ > 0,
which is a contradiction with the fact that GT is a tree.
Hence, if AE ≥ 1 there exist ui, uj such that ui ∈ Participants(uj), and
ui wants to connect to Cuj and uj wants to connect to Cui . By the affinity of
Q we have tha if the active node is ui or uj then it will add a link one of its
participants.
At each round k, depending on the current degree, we have one of the fol-
lowing cases:
AE = 0, CE = 0. After deleting all cycles and after updating all contracts a sink
configuration is reached (with AE = 0, CE = 0 it is not possible to add o remove
a cutting edge that routes traffic).
AE = 0, CE > 0. Eventually either a sink configuration is reached or a cutting
edge which routes traffic is deleted .
AE > 0. With probability greater than
1
n
the active node will add a link with a
participant. Then dynamics reaches to a configuration such that A′E = AE − 1,
C′E = CE configuration. And with probability less than 1 −
1
n
the active node
will add a link with a no participant and then A′E = AE − 1, C
′
E = CE + 1.
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In the worst case dynamics reaches to CE = 0, AE = 0 after adding n − 1
links between participants. Then it is needed to visit an AE > 0 configuration
O(n2) times to have CE = 0, AE = 0.
Furthermore if AE > 0, the active node adds a link, When AE = 0 but the
current configuration is not a sink AE = 0, CE > 0, all contracts are updated
before that any change in the topology occurs in an expected number of rounds
O(n2 lnn). In addition, all cycles are deleted at AE = 0, CE > 0 configurations.
After deleting a cycle an additional O(n2 lnn) rounds in expectation are needed
to update all contracts.
The dynamics passesO(n2) times from anAE = 1 configuration toO(n
2 lnn)
configurations with AE = 0. Besides, O(n
4 lnn) rounds in expectation are
needed to delete all cycles. ⊓⊔
C Efficiency and Complexity
Proof (proposition 2). Let us suppose that there is a pairwise Nash equilibrium
topology G such that G 6= GT . We know that G must be connected and acyclic.
If there exists a node u such that δ(u;G) > δ(u;GT ), since u has δ(u;GT )
participants, then G can not be a pairwise Nash equilibrium topology. Since G
is a tree and for all δ(u;G) ≤ δ(u;GT ) then δ(u;G) = δ(u;GT ).
Finally we prove that any link uv ofGT is also a link ofG. We define G0 = GT
and for i ≥ 0, Gi+1 = Gi − Leafs(Gi). For each i ≥ 0 and for each uv ∈ Gi
such that δ(u;Gi) = 1, we have uv ∈ G. In the base case the leafs of G and GT
are the same, and for each leaf u such that uv ∈ G and G is a pairwise Nash
equilibrium then u ∈ Participants(v).Therefore uv ∈ GT . Let us assume that
the hypothesis holds for i − 1. If there is a uv such that u is a leaf in Gi and
uv /∈ G, by the induction hypothesis and because δ(u;G) = δ(u;GT ) exists a
link uw ∈ G such that uw /∈ GT . The node u wants to keep uw because it is
contained in the path from u to v. If w has not incentive to remove the link it
is necessary that for some w′ ∈ Participant(w) the path in G between w and
w′ passes through u. Then we have that ww′ ∈ GT , but this link is incident
to a leaf w′ in Gj for some j < i, for hypothesis ww
′ ∈ G, so G has a cycle
(u,w,w′, . . . , u), contradiction. ⊓⊔
Proof (theorem 2). We transform IS to BR. Let 〈G,C〉 be a IS instance, where
G is a graph and 0 ≤ C ≤ |V (G)|. We construct a BR instance as follows:
− S is a star graph with center at the u node, where V (S) = V (G) ∪ {u}
(u /∈ V ) and E(S) = {uv : v ∈ V (G)}.
− Γ = {(v, u) : v ∈ V (G)} is a contract graph that generates S topology.
− P is the update traffic matrix generated by Γ , if (v, u) ∈ Γ then pvw =
Q(v, w;G), otherwise pvw = 0
− Q is some contract function such that for all G then Q(v, u;G) = 2 and
Q(u, v;G)− 2.
− π = 1 is the maintenance cost.
− cw = 1 for all w ∈ V , is the routing cost.
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Now we show that 〈G,C〉 ∈ IS ⇐⇒ 〈S, Γ,P, Q, T, π, (ci)i∈S , u, C〉 ∈ BR.
If 〈G,C〉 ∈ IS then there is an independent set I ⊆ V (G) such that |I| ≥ C.
Let us consider the u action corresponding to delete I ′ = {uv : v /∈ I} links
(breaking the {(v, u) : v /∈I} contracts). The u utility is U(u;S − I ′,P′) = |I| ≥
C, since u remains connected only to nodes I which don’t send traffic in S − I ′.
Hence u has a maintenance cost |I| and receives utility 2|I| from the other nodes.
Let us suppose that u applies a deviation such that produces an utility is
greater than or equal to C. The deviation neither can add a new link, nor can
update a contract. Then the only possible deviation is to break a set of contracts.
Let D be the set of nodes such that u remains connected after breaking D′ links
and U(u;S −D′,P′) ≥ C. D is an independent set, otherwise u routes at least
|V (S)| units of traffic , and u utility is U(u;S−D′,P′) ≤ −2|V (S)|+D < 0 ≤ C.
Since D is an independent set, then |D| ≥ C, otherwise U(u;S−D′,P′) < C. ⊓⊔
In order to prove LSCE and LSC NP-completeness we first define an in-
termediate NP-complete language. This problem is just a EXACT 3-COVER
restriction version.
Definition 5. Given a tuple 〈T, S〉, where T = {τ1, . . . , τ3t} is a set of terminals
and S = {σ1, . . . , σs} a subset of 3-subsets σi = {τi1, τi2, τi3} of T , such that
∀σ, σ′ ∈ S |σ ∩ σ′| ≤ 1; decide whether there is an exact cover C of S, that is,⋃
σ∈C σ = T and ∀σ, σ
′ ∈ C σ ∩ σ′ = ∅;
Theorem 7. RX3C is NP-complete.
Proof. We transformX3C to RX3C. Let 〈T, S〉 be a X3C instance, we construct
a 〈T ′, S′〉 RX3C instance as follows:
N = {#ij ,#
′
ij : 1 ≤ i ≤ s, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3}
N ∩ T = ∅
T ′ = T ∪N
S′ =
{
{#ij ,#
′
ij , σij} : 1 ≤ i ≤ s, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3
}
∪{
{#i1,#i2,#i3}, {#′i1,#
′
i2,#
′
i3} : 1 ≤ i ≤ s
}
Note that the reduction is correct, for all σ, σ′∈S′ if σ 6= σ′ then |σ∩σ′| ≤ 1. ⊓⊔
Now we show that that 〈T, S〉∈X3C ⇐⇒ 〈T ′, S′〉∈RX3C.
If there is an exact 3-cover C ⊆ S for 〈T, S〉, then we can construct an exact
3-cover C′ ⊆ S′ for 〈T ′, S′〉:
1 ≤ i ≤ s
{#ij ,#′ij , σij}∈C
′, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 if σi∈C
{#i1,#i2,#i3}, {#′i1,#
′
i2,#
′
i3}∈C
′ if σi /∈C
C′ contains all N terminals only once. Further, since C is a solution, C contains
all T terminals only once, so C′ also contains all T terminals only once.
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If exists a exact 3-cover C′ ⊆ S′ for 〈T ′, S′〉, then we can construct an exact
3-cover C ⊆ S for 〈T, S〉:
1 ≤ i ≤ s
σi /∈C if {#i1,#i2,#i3}∈C′
σi∈C if {#i1,#i2,#i3} /∈C
′
C′ contains all T ′ terminals only once, if {#i1,#i2,#i3} /∈C′, then for all 1 ≤
j ≤ 3, {#ij ,#′ij , σij}∈C
′.
Proof (theorem 6). We transform RX3C to LSCE. Let 〈T, S〉 be a RX3C in-
stance, we construct a 〈M,π, (ci)i∈V (GM), C〉 LSCE instance as follows:
GM
r
σ1 σs
τ11 τ12 τ13 τs1 τs2 τs3
k k
k′ k
′
k′ k′ k
′
k′
1 1
1
1 1
1
V (GM) = S ∪ T ∪ {r}
E(GM) = {(r, σ, k) : σ∈S} ∪
{(σ, τ, k′) : σ∈S, τ ∈σ} ∪
{(τ, τ ′, 1) : σ∈S, τ < τ ′∈σ}
pi = 1
ci = 1 ∀i∈V (GM)
The traffic matrixM is defined by the directed weighted graphG: if (i, j, w) ∈
G then mij = w, otherwise mij = 0.
Given a possible 3-cover S′ ⊆ S for 〈T, S〉 we can construct the associated
graph G(S′) where V (G(S′)) = V (GM) and
E(G(S′)) = {(r, σ) : σ∈S} ∪ {(σ, τ) : σ∈S′, τ ∈σ}
If S′ is an exact 3-cover then G(S′) is a spanning tree of GM . We define C in
such way that if S′ is a exact 3-cover then C(G(S′)) = C.
Let S′ be an exact 3-cover, we denote by CXY the routing cost arising for
the traffic sent from X to Y nodes, in the G(S′) topology.
In G(S′), ∀σ ∈ S trσ = k. For all σ such that (r, σ) ∈ E, then the traffic
between a σ and r, only is routed only through σ and r nodes, therefore CRS =
2sk.
In G(S′), ∀σ ∈ S, ∀τ ∈ σ, tστ = k′. For a σ ∈ S′ node the shortest path to
τ ∈σ is 〈σ, τ〉. Instead to a σ /∈S′ node the shortest path to τ ∈σ is 〈σ, r, σ′, τ〉
where σ′∈S′. Therefore we have that CST = 2k′3t+ 9k′(s− t) = 6k′(3s− 2t).
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Finally to calculate CTT we distinguish again two cases. Let τ1, τ2 ∈σ such
that σ∈S′, the shortest path is 〈τ1, σ, τ2〉. The total amount of traffic arises for
these nodes is 12t, because |S′| = 3t. If τ1, τ2 ∈σ such that σ /∈S
′, the shortest
path is 〈τ1, σ, r, σ′, τ2〉 where σ′∈S′ because ∀σ, σ′∈S such that σ 6= σ′, |σ∩σ′| ≤
1. |S − S′| = s− t so the cost is 24(s− t), in total we have CTT = 4(6s− 3t).
We define k, k′ and C from the CXY values in such a way that only the
topologies B = G(S′) for an exact 3-cover S′ satisfies SC(B) ≤ C:
CTT = 4(6s− 3t) CST = 6k
′(3s− 2t)
k′ = CTT k = CST + k
′
CRS = 2sk C = CRS + CST + CTT + 2π(s+ t)
Now we show that 〈T, S〉∈RX3C ⇐⇒ 〈M,π, (ci)i∈V (GM), C〉∈LSCE:
If S′ ⊆ S is an exact 3-cover of T , the tree G(S′) is a pairwise Nash equilib-
rium topology such that SC(G(S′)) = C.
Let G = (V,E) be a pairwise Nash equilibrium such that SC(G) ≤ C. G is a
tree and the maintenance cost is 2π(s+ t). Below we show that G is a spanning
tree of GM :
(i) ∀σ ∈ S (r, σ) ∈ E, otherwise we have a partition {X,Y } of S such that
σ∈X=⇒ (r, σ)∈E, σ∈Y =⇒ (r, σ) /∈E and |Y | ≥ 1. Then the routing cost
arising for the traffic sent fromR to S is greater or equal than 2k|X |+4k|Y | =
2k(|X |+ |Y |)+ 2k|Y | and the social cost SC(G) > 2ks+2k|Y |+2π(s+ t) ≥
2sk + 2k + 2π(s+ t) > C.
(ii) ∀τ ∈ T there is a unique σ ∈ S such that τ ∈ σ and (σ, τ) ∈ E, otherwise
or exists at least a τ ∈ T with σ, σ′ such that (σ, τ), (σ′, τ) ∈E (this is not
possible because implies that G has a cycle), or we have a partition {X,Y }
of T such that τ ∈X=⇒∃σ(σ, τ)∈E ∧ τ ∈σ, τ ∈Y =⇒(∀στ ∈σ=⇒(σ, τ) /∈E)
(it is possible that these τ are connected to a σ node such that τ /∈σ, to the r
node or to other τ ′∈T ). Therefore SC(G) > CRS+6k′(3s−2t)−2k′+4k > C
(iii) We have already shown that G is a spanning tree of GM , thus G is pairwise
Nash equilibrium topology, and SC(G)−CTT (G) = C−CTT (where CTT (G)
is the cost arising for the the traffic from T to T in G). In order for the
CTT (G) ≤ CTT , let si be the number of σ ∈ S with degree i, we have
CTT (G) = 2(6s4 + 10s3 + 12s2 + 12s1) with 3s4 + 2s3 + s2 = 3t and s1 +
s2 + s3 + s4 = s. Manipulating expressions:
s4 = t−
2s3 + s2
3
s1 = s− t+
2s3 + s2
3
− s3 − s2
CTT (G) = 2((6t− 4s3 − 2s2) + 10s3 + 12s2 + (12s− 12t+ 8s3 + 4s2 − 12s3 − 12s2))
CTT (G) = 2(12s− 6t+ 2s3 + 2s2) CTT (G) = 2(2(6s− 3t) + 2s3 + 2s2)
Where s3 = s2 = 0 then s4 = t and s0 = s and CTT (G) = CTT . Otherwise,
s4 < t and s3 + s2 > 0, hence CTT (G) > CTT .
When G is pairwise Nash equilibrium topology and SC(G) ≤ C the σ∈V nodes
such that δ(σ;G) = 4 form form an exact 3-cover to T . ⊓⊔
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Proof (theorem 6). We transform RX3C to LSC. Let 〈T, S〉 be a RX3C in-
stance, we construct a 〈M,π, (ci)i∈V (GM), C〉 LSC instance as follows:
GM
σ1 σs
τ11 τ12 τ13 τs1 τs2 τs3
k′ k
′
k′ k′ k
′
k′
k
k′′ k′′
k′′
k′′ k′′
k′′
ci = 1 ∀i∈V (GM)
V (GM) = S ∪ T
E(GM) = {(σ, σ′, k) : σ, σ′∈S, σ 6= σ′}
∪ {(σ, τ, k′) : σ∈S, τ ∈σ}
∪ {(τ, τ ′, k′′) : σ∈S, τ < τ ′∈σ}
Given a possible 3-cover S′ ⊆ S for 〈T, S〉 we can construct the associated
graph G(S′) where V (G(S′)) = V (GM) and
E(G(S′)) = {(r, σ) : σ∈S} ∪ {(σ, τ) : σ∈S′, τ ∈σ}
If S′ is an exact 3-cover then G(S′) is a spanning tree of GM . We define C in
such way that if S′ is a exact 3-cover then C(G(S′)) = C.
Let k > π and let G be the optimal topology. The induced graph by the
S vertices, G[S], is a s-complete graph: if there is a pair σ, σ′ ∈ S such that
dist(σ, σ′;G) > 1, then the graph G′ = G + σσ′ has social cost strictly less,
SC(G′) < SC(G). We assign a value for k enough large so that any topology G,
if G[S] 6= Ks then SC(G) > C.
In G(S′) we have that for σ∈S′ the distance between σ and τ ∈ σ is 1, for
σ /∈ S′ this distance is 2. If π > k′, in the optimal topology the τ ∈ T nodes
are connected only to one σ: since G[S] = Ks the τ nodes are at a distance 2
of all σ, and there is no social benefit in adding links in order to reduces these
distances. We assign a value for k′ enough large so that if (τ, σ)∈G where τ /∈σ
then SC(G) > C.
Finally for the traffic between τ, τ ′ ∈ σ we require that only the topologies
B = G(S′) for an exact 3-cover S′ satisfies SC(G) ≤ C.
Let S′ be an exact 3-cover, we denote by CXY the routing cost arising for
the traffic sent from X to Y , in the G(S′) topology.
CSS = k(s
2 − s) CST = 6k
′(2s− t) CTT = 6k
′′(3s− t)
We define the k, k′, k′′ and π as follows:
k = CST + CTT + π(6t+ s
2) k′ = CTT
k′′ = 1 π = CST + CTT
C = CSS + CST + CTT + π(6t+ s
2 − s)
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Now we show that 〈T, S〉∈RX3C ⇐⇒ 〈M,π, (ci)i∈V (GM), C〉∈LSC:
If S′ ⊆ S is an exact 3-cover of T , the tree G(S′) has SC(G(S′)) = C.
If 〈M,π, (ci)i∈V (GM), C〉∈LSC exists a graph G such that SC(G) ≤ C. G is
connected and satisfies:
(i) ∀σσ′∈S (σ, σ′)∈E, the traffic sent from S to S entails a cost CST . Otherwise
let’s consider the cost arising for the traffic sent from S to S, if the induced
graph G[S] is not the s-complete, we can add a link between two σ, σ′ /∈E,
so the routing cost has a strictly decrease, greater or equal than k − π.
Graphs G′ that minimizes the traffic from S to S have G′[S] = ks, and the
routing cost from S to S is k(s2 − s) = CSS . If G[S] is not the Ks we have
SC(G) > k(s2 − s) + k − π = CSS + CST + CTT + π(6t+ s2 − 1) ≥ C.
(ii) |E(G)| = (s
2−s)
2 + 3t. Otherwise or G is not connected or SC(G) > CSS +
π(6t+ s2 − s) + π = CSS + π(6t+ s2 − s) + CST + CTT = C.
(iii) ∀τ ∈T ∃σ∈S, τ ∈σ∧(σ, τ)∈E. Otherwise there is a partition {X,Y, Z} of T ,
where τ ∈X⇐⇒∃σ∈S, τ ∈σ∧ (σ, τ)∈E, τ ∈Y⇐⇒∃σ∈S, τ /∈σ∧ (σ, τ)∈E,
τ ∈Z⇐⇒∀σ ∈S, (σ, τ) /∈E, such that |Y | + |Z| > 0 (notice that the τ ∈Z
nodes are connected to others τ ′∈T ). Then SC(G) > CSS+π(6t+s2−s)+
4k′(3s)− |X + Z|2k′ + |Z|2k′ ≥ CSS + π(6t+ s2 − s) + CST + 2k′ > C.
(iv) ∀(σ, τ) ∈E, δ(σ;G) = 4. Now we have that SC(G) − CTT (G) = C − CTT
(where CTT (G) is the routing cost arising for the traffic between T and
T ). For CTT (G) ≤ CTT , let si be the number of σ ∈ S with grade i, we
have CTT (G) = 2(6s4 + 8s3 + 9s2 + 9s1) with 3s4 + 2s3 + s2 = 3t and
s1 + s2 + s3 + s4 = s. Manipulating expressions:
s4 = t−
2s3 + s2
3
s1 = s− t+
2s3 + s2
3
− s3 − s2
CTT (G) = 2((6t− 4s3 − 2s2) + 8s3 + 9s2 + (9s− 9t+ 6s3 + 3s2 − 9s3 − 9s2))
CTT (G) = 2(9s− 3t+ s2 + s3) CTT (G) = 2(3(3s− t) + s2 + s1)
Where s3 = s2 = 0 then s4 = t, s0 = s and CTT (G) = CTT . Where s4 < t
then s3 + s2 > 0 thus CTT (G) > CTT .
⊓⊔
